Gateway Load Balancer and Appliance Insertion
Learn AWS Networking and Content Delivery - Part 051
Deep dive Gateway Load Balancer untuk appliance insertion, GENEVE encapsulation, inspection VPC, centralized firewalling, route-table steering, failover, MTU, flow stickiness, dan debugging produksi.
Part 051 — Gateway Load Balancer and Appliance Insertion
Gateway Load Balancer adalah load balancer yang paling sering disalahpahami karena namanya mirip ALB/NLB, tetapi problem yang diselesaikan berbeda.
ALB menjawab:
Bagaimana request HTTP diarahkan ke target aplikasi yang tepat?
NLB menjawab:
Bagaimana flow TCP/UDP/TLS diarahkan ke target transport yang tepat?
Gateway Load Balancer menjawab:
Bagaimana traffic IP dipaksa melewati fleet appliance jaringan secara transparan,
scale-out, highly available, dan tetap mempertahankan flow affinity?
Appliance di sini bisa berarti:
- firewall generasi baru;
- IDS/IPS;
- packet inspection appliance;
- egress inspection appliance;
- east-west inspection appliance;
- network security vendor appliance;
- transparent proxy yang memang mendukung mode ini;
- custom packet processor yang memahami GENEVE.
GWLB bukan pengganti ALB/NLB. GWLB adalah service insertion primitive.
1. Masalah yang Diselesaikan GWLB
Sebelum GWLB, desain firewall scale-out di AWS sering memakai kombinasi:
- EC2 appliance fleet;
- route table steering;
- source/destination check disabled;
- Auto Scaling Group;
- Lambda untuk route update;
- vendor-specific clustering;
- ECMP via Transit Gateway;
- manual failover;
- custom health automation.
Masalahnya:
- Failover sulit.
- Stateful flow mudah pecah.
- Route table update bersifat control-plane operation.
- Appliance scale-out membutuhkan mekanisme distribusi traffic.
- Traffic symmetry harus dijaga manual.
- Banyak desain gagal saat partial AZ failure.
GWLB memindahkan sebagian besar problem distribusi dan failover appliance ke managed data plane AWS.
Mental model:
Route table steers traffic to GWLB endpoint.
GWLB endpoint sends traffic to Gateway Load Balancer.
Gateway Load Balancer selects healthy appliance target.
Traffic is encapsulated using GENEVE.
Appliance inspects/forwards traffic.
GWLB decapsulates and returns traffic to normal path.
2. Komponen Utama GWLB
Komponen penting:
| Komponen | Fungsi |
|---|---|
| Gateway Load Balancer | Mendistribusikan IP packets ke appliance fleet. |
| GWLB target group | Kumpulan appliance target. |
| Appliance target | EC2/vendor appliance yang mendukung GENEVE. |
| GWLB endpoint service | PrivateLink service yang mengekspos GWLB ke consumer VPC. |
| Gateway Load Balancer endpoint | Endpoint di consumer/inspection path yang menjadi target route table. |
| Route table | Mekanisme steering traffic ke endpoint. |
| GENEVE | Encapsulation protocol antara GWLB dan appliance. |
Perhatikan: yang membuat traffic melewati GWLB bukan security group, bukan DNS, bukan listener rule HTTP. Yang membuatnya lewat adalah route table.
3. GWLB Bekerja di Layer Berbeda
Gateway Load Balancer beroperasi pada level paket IP.
Ia tidak membaca:
- HTTP host header;
- path;
- cookie;
- JWT;
- OIDC session;
- gRPC method;
- application-specific semantics.
Ia membaca flow network untuk menentukan target appliance dan mempertahankan affinity.
Input : original IP packet
Wrap : GENEVE encapsulation
Target : appliance
Output : inspected packet path
Implikasi:
- security decision detail tetap di appliance;
- GWLB bukan policy engine firewall;
- GWLB bukan WAF;
- GWLB tidak menggantikan Network Firewall;
- GWLB tidak menggantikan NACL/SG;
- GWLB adalah load balancer untuk appliance fleet.
4. GENEVE Encapsulation
GWLB mengirim traffic ke appliance menggunakan GENEVE.
Konseptualnya:
Original packet:
src=10.10.1.25 dst=198.51.100.10 proto=TCP dport=443
Encapsulated packet to appliance:
outer src=<GWLB IP>
outer dst=<Appliance IP>
UDP/6081
GENEVE header
inner original packet
Appliance harus mampu:
- menerima traffic GENEVE UDP/6081;
- melakukan decapsulation;
- membaca original packet;
- membuat allow/drop/inspect decision;
- mengembalikan packet dengan encapsulation sesuai ekspektasi GWLB.
Jika appliance tidak mendukung GENEVE, ia bukan target GWLB yang valid secara praktis.
5. Kenapa GWLB Bukan Sekadar NLB ke Firewall
NLB bisa mengirim TCP/UDP traffic ke target. Tetapi firewall appliance transparent biasanya perlu melihat paket asli dan menjaga inspection path untuk banyak protokol.
NLB mental model:
Client flow -> NLB -> selected target
GWLB mental model:
Original IP traffic -> route steering -> GWLBE -> GWLB -> appliance -> GWLB -> onward route
Perbedaan utama:
| Dimensi | NLB | GWLB |
|---|---|---|
| Layer utama | L4 | L3/IP packet forwarding |
| Use case | Expose service | Insert appliance |
| Target | App/service target | Security/network appliance |
| Encapsulation | Tidak memakai GENEVE | Memakai GENEVE |
| Route steering | Optional | Fundamental |
| Transparent inspection | Bukan target utama | Target utama |
| PrivateLink provider | Bisa | Bisa, khusus appliance service insertion |
6. GWLB Endpoint sebagai Data-Plane Hook
Gateway Load Balancer endpoint adalah entry point di VPC consumer yang menjadi target route table.
Contoh route egress workload:
Workload subnet route table:
10.0.0.0/16 local
0.0.0.0/0 vpce-gwlb-egress-az-a
Dengan route ini, packet dari workload menuju internet tidak langsung ke NAT Gateway/IGW. Ia masuk ke GWLBE terlebih dahulu.
Lalu path bisa menjadi:
EC2 private subnet
-> route table 0.0.0.0/0 to GWLBE
-> Gateway Load Balancer
-> firewall appliance
-> Gateway Load Balancer
-> GWLBE
-> route to NAT Gateway
-> Internet Gateway
-> Internet
Ini menunjukkan satu prinsip penting:
GWLB tidak membuat kebijakan egress dengan sendirinya. Ia membuat traffic melewati appliance yang membuat keputusan egress.
7. Centralized Inspection VPC Pattern
Pattern paling umum:
Kelebihan:
- firewall dikelola di account/VPC khusus;
- workload VPC tidak perlu punya appliance sendiri;
- kebijakan security bisa distandarkan;
- traffic egress dari banyak VPC bisa diinspeksi terpusat;
- vendor appliance bisa di-scale via ASG;
- platform team bisa memiliki lifecycle appliance.
Risiko:
- centralized inspection menjadi dependency kritikal;
- route table kompleks;
- cross-AZ data processing bisa mahal jika salah desain;
- asymmetric routing mudah terjadi;
- debugging perlu memahami beberapa VPC sekaligus;
- blast radius firewall policy bisa lintas banyak aplikasi.
8. Distributed Inspection Pattern
Alternatif: setiap workload VPC punya GWLB endpoint dan mungkin appliance local/per-domain.
Distributed endpoint, centralized appliance service.
Gunakan jika:
- banyak VPC perlu inspection yang sama;
- policy team ingin control appliance fleet;
- app team tetap memiliki route table di VPC masing-masing;
- appliance vendor mendukung GWLB endpoint service model.
9. North-South vs East-West Inspection
North-south
Traffic dari atau ke internet/on-prem.
Contoh:
Internet -> public ALB -> protected app
Private app -> inspected egress -> internet
On-prem -> inspected ingress -> workload
East-west
Traffic antar internal workloads.
Contoh:
App VPC A -> App VPC B
Prod shared service -> workload account
Microservice domain A -> domain B
East-west inspection lebih sulit karena:
- route symmetry harus dijaga dua arah;
- traffic bisa masuk dari TGW, peering, PrivateLink, atau local VPC;
- inspection bisa menambah latency signifikan;
- stateful firewall perlu melihat both directions;
- dependency graph service menjadi lebih sulit dibaca.
Rule praktis:
Jangan menerapkan east-west inspection global tanpa service taxonomy dan route-domain design yang matang.
10. Route Table Steering
GWLB pattern selalu kembali ke route table.
Contoh egress inspection per AZ:
Private subnet AZ-a route table:
10.0.0.0/16 local
0.0.0.0/0 vpce-gwlb-egress-az-a
Private subnet AZ-b route table:
10.0.0.0/16 local
0.0.0.0/0 vpce-gwlb-egress-az-b
Setelah inspection, route di inspection VPC dapat mengarah ke NAT Gateway:
Inspection subnet route table:
10.0.0.0/8 tgw-xxx or local return path
0.0.0.0/0 nat-az-a
Jangan mencampur endpoint lintas AZ tanpa alasan kuat. Untuk stateful appliance, AZ affinity adalah bagian dari reliability model.
11. Appliance Mode dan Stateful Inspection
Jika menggunakan Transit Gateway untuk mengarahkan traffic ke inspection VPC, stateful appliance membutuhkan jalur simetris.
Problem:
Request path : Workload A -> TGW -> Inspection AZ-a -> Firewall A -> Workload B
Response path : Workload B -> TGW -> Inspection AZ-b -> Firewall B -> Workload A
Firewall B tidak melihat request awal. Ia bisa drop response karena tidak punya state.
Untuk desain berbasis TGW, appliance mode pada VPC attachment inspection sering menjadi komponen penting agar flow tetap sticky ke AZ yang sama.
Mental model:
Stateful inspection requires both directions of a flow to meet the same state owner.
State owner bisa:
- firewall appliance tertentu;
- appliance cluster tertentu;
- AZ-local appliance group;
- session table vendor-managed.
Yang tidak boleh: request dan response diproses oleh node yang tidak berbagi state.
12. Health Checks dan Flow Behavior
GWLB melakukan health check ke target appliance. Target unhealthy tidak menerima new flow.
Namun untuk existing flow, perilaku desain harus dipahami hati-hati:
- new flows diarahkan ke healthy target;
- existing flow affinity bisa tetap menjaga flow ke target yang sama;
- appliance failure bisa memutus flow aktif;
- deregistration membutuhkan draining semantics;
- health endpoint appliance harus mencerminkan kemampuan forwarding, bukan hanya proses HTTP hidup.
Health check buruk:
GET /health -> 200 OK jika management plane hidup
Health check lebih baik:
200 OK hanya jika:
- packet engine running;
- GENEVE listener available;
- policy loaded;
- route to next hop valid;
- license/state engine healthy;
- CPU/memory tidak dalam fail-closed threshold.
13. Fail-Open vs Fail-Closed
Pertanyaan arsitektur besar:
Jika inspection layer gagal, traffic harus tetap lewat atau harus berhenti?
Fail-open
Traffic tetap lewat agar aplikasi tidak down.
Cocok untuk:
- low-risk internal inspection;
- availability lebih penting dari strict inspection;
- temporary degraded mode;
- observability-only appliance.
Risiko:
- security control bisa terlewati;
- audit perlu explicit exception;
- sulit diterima untuk regulated egress.
Fail-closed
Traffic berhenti jika tidak bisa diinspeksi.
Cocok untuk:
- high-risk egress;
- compliance requirement;
- regulated workload;
- sensitive data boundary.
Risiko:
- firewall outage menjadi application outage;
- blast radius policy mistake besar;
- incident response harus matang.
Prinsip produksi:
Fail mode adalah business decision, bukan hanya network decision.
14. MTU, Encapsulation, dan Packet Drop yang Sulit Dilihat
GENEVE menambah overhead. Jika packet mendekati MTU path maksimum, encapsulation bisa membuat packet terlalu besar.
Gejala:
- aplikasi intermittently timeout;
- small request berhasil, large response gagal;
- TLS handshake gagal pada certificate chain besar;
- upload/download besar gagal;
- Flow Logs terlihat ACCEPT, tetapi aplikasi tetap timeout;
- packet capture menunjukkan retransmission.
Checklist:
- Apakah appliance mendukung MTU yang cukup?
- Apakah path melakukan fragmentation?
- Apakah DF bit menyebabkan silent drop?
- Apakah PMTUD berfungsi di semua hop?
- Apakah vendor appliance merekomendasikan MSS clamping?
- Apakah traffic melewati VPN/DX/TGW yang menambah overhead lain?
Rule praktis:
Untuk inspection path, MTU bukan detail kecil. Ia adalah bagian dari correctness.
15. Cross-Zone Load Balancing
GWLB dapat memakai cross-zone load balancing, tetapi jangan aktifkan hanya karena terdengar lebih resilient.
Pertanyaan sebelum mengaktifkan:
- Apakah appliance stateful?
- Apakah return path tetap simetris?
- Apakah cross-AZ charge dapat diterima?
- Apakah target capacity per AZ tidak seimbang?
- Apakah failure mode AZ-local sudah diuji?
- Apakah route table consumer mengarah ke endpoint AZ-local?
Default terbaik untuk banyak desain security appliance:
Keep the flow AZ-local unless you intentionally design otherwise.
16. Security Groups, NACL, dan Appliance Policy
GWLB bukan pengganti security group.
Layer policy tetap:
Security Group -> resource/ENI stateful allow boundary
NACL -> subnet stateless guardrail
Route Table -> path steering
GWLB -> appliance fleet distribution
Appliance Policy -> packet/content/security decision
IAM/Endpoint Policy -> control and access authorization
Jangan memindahkan semua kontrol ke firewall appliance.
Anti-pattern:
SG allow all internal.
NACL allow all.
All enforcement hanya di appliance.
Masalah:
- lateral movement jika route bypass terjadi;
- debugging sulit;
- least privilege hilang;
- incident blast radius besar;
- audit harus membaca policy vendor saja.
Desain lebih baik:
SG tetap least privilege.
NACL guardrail sederhana.
Route table memastikan path inspection.
Appliance menerapkan advanced inspection.
17. Appliance Insertion for Centralized Egress
Pattern egress umum:
Policy responsibilities:
| Layer | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| Workload SG | App boleh keluar ke mana secara basic. |
| Route table | Semua default egress lewat inspection. |
| Firewall appliance | URL/category/FQDN/IP/protocol decision. |
| NAT Gateway | IPv4 source translation ke internet. |
| DNS Firewall | Domain-level exfiltration guardrail. |
| Flow Logs | Metadata proof. |
| Appliance logs | Security decision proof. |
18. Appliance Insertion for Ingress
Ingress inspection lebih tricky karena traffic sering sudah melewati CloudFront/WAF/ALB.
Possible path:
Internet
-> CloudFront/WAF
-> public ALB
-> GWLB inspection path
-> private app
Tetapi banyak desain lebih baik memakai:
Internet
-> CloudFront/WAF
-> ALB
-> app SG least privilege
Tanpa GWLB, jika inspection yang dibutuhkan adalah HTTP-layer protection, WAF + ALB observability sering lebih tepat.
Gunakan GWLB ingress jika:
- butuh network-layer appliance vendor;
- appliance melakukan protocol inspection non-HTTP;
- regulatory boundary mengharuskan centralized network firewall;
- traffic dari on-prem/partner harus melewati appliance sebelum app;
- L3/L4 threat detection dibutuhkan di jalur ingress.
19. Appliance Insertion for East-West via Transit Gateway
Pattern:
Routing policy:
VPC A attachment route table:
VPC B CIDR -> Inspection VPC attachment
Inspection attachment route table:
VPC A CIDR -> VPC A attachment
VPC B CIDR -> VPC B attachment
Failure mode:
- response bypasses inspection;
- TGW route table wrong association;
- propagated route leaks around inspection;
- appliance health check green but policy drops;
- appliance mode not configured when stateful inspection requires symmetry;
- CIDR overlap makes routing impossible without translation.
20. GWLB vs AWS Network Firewall
| Question | GWLB | AWS Network Firewall |
|---|---|---|
| Need third-party appliance? | Strong fit | Not the goal |
| Need managed AWS firewall engine? | No | Strong fit |
| Need vendor-specific IDS/IPS/URL filtering? | Strong fit | Depends on feature fit |
| Need Suricata-compatible rules managed by AWS service? | No | Strong fit |
| Need appliance marketplace integration? | Strong fit | No |
| Need lower operational vendor dependency? | Depends | Strong fit |
| Need custom packet processor? | Possible | No |
Decision rule:
Use AWS Network Firewall when AWS-native managed firewall semantics fit.
Use GWLB when you need to insert and scale an appliance fleet.
21. GWLB vs Transit Gateway ECMP
Transit Gateway ECMP can distribute traffic across VPN/Connect attachments or appliances in some designs. GWLB is more appliance-insertion-specific.
GWLB gives:
- target health integration;
- GENEVE-based transparent packet delivery;
- endpoint service consumption;
- simpler appliance fleet scaling;
- service provider/consumer model;
- flow stickiness semantics.
TGW ECMP gives:
- dynamic routing distribution;
- BGP integration;
- SD-WAN style connectivity;
- route-domain integration.
Do not choose based on “which one can balance traffic”. Choose based on control model:
Route-domain balancing? -> TGW/BGP/Connect model
Transparent appliance service? -> GWLB model
22. Multi-Account Ownership Model
Recommended account separation:
Network account:
- TGW / Cloud WAN core
- inspection VPC
- GWLB service
- shared egress
Security tooling account:
- firewall manager/log analytics/SIEM integration
- security policy repository
Workload accounts:
- app VPC route tables or shared VPC subnets
- GWLB endpoints if distributed
Contract between platform and app teams:
inspection_contract:
default_egress: required
inspection_endpoint_per_az: required
route_bypass: prohibited
log_retention_days: 365
fail_mode: fail_closed_for_regulated
exception_process: security_approval
ownership:
app_route_table: platform
firewall_policy: security
app_sg: application_team
23. IaC Structure
A production module should not expose raw route magic as copy-paste.
Better module boundaries:
modules/
gwlb-service/
creates GWLB, target group, listener, endpoint service
appliance-fleet/
creates ASG/launch template/vendor appliance bootstrap
gwlb-endpoint-consumer/
creates GWLBE per subnet/AZ
inspected-route-domain/
associates route table entries to endpoint IDs
inspection-observability/
enables Flow Logs, appliance log sinks, alarms
Important outputs:
gwlb_service_name: com.amazonaws.vpce.region.vpce-svc-...
gwlb_arn: arn:aws:elasticloadbalancing:...
target_group_arn: arn:aws:elasticloadbalancing:...
endpoint_ids_by_az:
ap-southeast-1a: vpce-...
ap-southeast-1b: vpce-...
inspection_route_tables:
app_private_a: rtb-...
24. Observability Model
GWLB troubleshooting needs multiple telemetry sources.
| Source | Tells You |
|---|---|
| VPC Flow Logs workload ENI | Did workload send packet? Was SG/NACL allowing? |
| VPC Flow Logs GWLBE subnet | Did route steering reach endpoint path? |
| Appliance logs | Did policy allow/drop? Was threat detected? |
| Appliance packet capture | Did GENEVE arrive? Was decapsulation successful? |
| ELB metrics | Target health, processed bytes, active flow signals. |
| NAT Gateway metrics | Was egress after inspection successful? |
| TGW route table | Was inter-VPC routing correct? |
| Reachability Analyzer | Static path validation for supported resource paths. |
Observability principle:
Flow Logs prove network metadata.
Appliance logs prove security decision.
Packet capture proves packet-level mechanics.
Route tables prove intended path.
25. Debugging Runbook: Workload Cannot Reach Internet Through GWLB
Step 1 — Prove DNS is not the problem
nslookup example.com
If DNS fails, GWLB is likely irrelevant.
Step 2 — Prove route table steering
Check workload subnet route table:
0.0.0.0/0 -> vpce-gwlb-...
If route points to NAT directly, inspection is bypassed.
Step 3 — Prove endpoint exists in same AZ
Check:
workload subnet AZ == selected GWLBE AZ
Cross-AZ design may work but complicates failure/cost.
Step 4 — Prove appliance target health
Check GWLB target group target health.
If unhealthy:
- GENEVE listener down;
- health port wrong;
- SG/NACL blocks health check;
- appliance bootstrap failed;
- license/policy engine unavailable.
Step 5 — Prove appliance policy decision
Look for:
src workload IP
dst resolved IP
port 443
action allow/drop/reset
policy rule ID
Step 6 — Prove post-inspection route
After appliance permits traffic, where does it go?
- NAT Gateway route correct?
- TGW return route correct?
- IGW path exists?
- NACL allows ephemeral response?
Step 7 — Check MTU symptoms
Test small vs large payload:
curl -v https://example.com/
curl -v https://large-object.example/file
If small works and large fails, inspect MTU/MSS/fragmentation.
26. Debugging Runbook: Intermittent Drops
Intermittent GWLB issues usually come from:
- asymmetric routing;
- cross-AZ steering;
- unhealthy appliance flapping;
- long-lived TCP idle timeout;
- appliance CPU saturation;
- state table exhaustion;
- MTU issues;
- policy reload resets;
- NAT port exhaustion after inspection;
- DNS resolving to variable destination IPs while policy is IP-based.
Checklist:
[ ] Are request and response inspected by same state owner?
[ ] Are targets flapping in target group health?
[ ] Is appliance CPU/memory/session table near limit?
[ ] Are long-lived connections exceeding idle timeout?
[ ] Are route tables stable?
[ ] Are all AZs configured symmetrically?
[ ] Are Flow Logs showing REJECT or only ACCEPT?
[ ] Are appliance logs showing drop/reset?
[ ] Is NAT Gateway showing ErrorPortAllocation?
27. Common Anti-Patterns
Anti-pattern 1 — One appliance instance as “temporary firewall”
All egress -> one EC2 firewall
This creates a hidden single point of failure.
Anti-pattern 2 — Route table update as failover mechanism
If firewall fails, Lambda rewrites default route.
This moves failover into control plane and is slow/risky compared with data-plane target health.
Anti-pattern 3 — Cross-AZ inspection without accounting for state/cost
AZ-a workload -> AZ-b endpoint/appliance -> AZ-a NAT
This can create cost, latency, and stateful failover issues.
Anti-pattern 4 — Appliance health check that only checks management UI
Firewall UI up does not mean packet engine forwarding correctly.
Anti-pattern 5 — No bypass detection
If someone changes route table from:
0.0.0.0/0 -> GWLBE
to:
0.0.0.0/0 -> NAT Gateway
inspection is bypassed. This must be caught by config rules, IaC drift detection, or Network Access Analyzer-style checks.
28. Design Checklist
Before using GWLB in production, answer:
[ ] What traffic must be inspected?
[ ] Is this north-south, east-west, or egress?
[ ] Is the appliance stateless or stateful?
[ ] What is the required fail mode?
[ ] Does appliance support GENEVE correctly?
[ ] What health check proves forwarding health?
[ ] Is route symmetry guaranteed?
[ ] Is endpoint deployed per AZ?
[ ] Is cross-zone load balancing intentional?
[ ] Is MTU/MSS tested?
[ ] Are logs centralized?
[ ] Are route-table bypasses detectable?
[ ] Is policy change audited?
[ ] Is appliance scale tested under realistic traffic?
[ ] Is rollback path documented?
29. Production Reference: Inspected Egress
Properties:
- endpoint per AZ;
- appliance target per AZ;
- NAT per AZ;
- logs from workload, endpoint subnet, firewall, and NAT;
- fail mode documented;
- route bypass monitored;
- policy changes reviewed;
- exception path explicit.
30. Invariants
Keep these invariants in your head:
- GWLB inserts appliances; it does not replace application load balancing.
- Traffic goes through GWLB because route tables point to GWLB endpoints.
- Appliance must support GENEVE and understand encapsulated traffic.
- Stateful inspection requires symmetric routing or shared state.
- Health checks must test forwarding readiness, not only management-plane liveness.
- MTU and idle timeout issues are common and subtle.
- Fail-open/fail-closed is a business/security decision.
- Centralized inspection simplifies governance but increases blast radius.
- GWLB endpoint is powered by PrivateLink-style service consumption semantics.
- Observability must include route, flow, appliance decision, and packet-level evidence.
31. What You Should Be Able to Do Now
After this part, you should be able to:
- explain why GWLB exists;
- design centralized egress inspection;
- explain GENEVE encapsulation at a practical level;
- distinguish GWLB from ALB, NLB, Network Firewall, and TGW ECMP;
- reason about route-table steering;
- identify asymmetric routing risks;
- define fail-open/fail-closed behavior;
- design health checks that reflect forwarding readiness;
- debug workload egress through GWLB;
- design observability for appliance insertion.
The next part moves from appliance insertion to load balancer security and TLS patterns: where TLS terminates, when to re-encrypt, how SNI/certificates/mTLS behave, and how to avoid fake “end-to-end encryption” assumptions.
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